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Shadmehr and Ahmed’s book is a welcome extension of optimal foraging theory and 
neuroeconomics, achieved by integrating both with parameters relating to effort and rate of 
movement. Their most persuasive and prolific data comes from saccades, where times 
before and after decision are reasonably determinate. Skeletal movements are less likely to 




Shadmehr and Ahmed (2020) give a compelling statement of optimal foraging theory 
incorporating effort and speed of movement, providing rich targets both for behavioural 
analysis and for neuroeconomic inquiry into the substrates of selection and control. Their 
most common and convincing illustrations concern saccades, which are a convenient target 
for neuroeconomics. Eye movements relative to the skull have a simple geometric 
organisation, with a correspondingly simple topographic representation. Each eye’s 
movements depend on only six specialised muscles, and different movements are strictly 
mutually exclusive. Eyes rotate around their own centres of mass, making gravitational 
loads irrelevant. Relative to a stationary head, the relationships between efferent nervous 
activity and muscle activation, and between muscle activity and movement, are close to 
direct correspondence. Finally, the ‘collicular burst’ constitutes an uncontroversial 
culmination of the decision process, clearly demarcating processes before and after it. 
Varying the reward contingencies associated with cued saccade targets, thus manipulating 
the consequences of movements, while measuring neural activity upstream of oculomotor 
control is one of the founding experimental paradigms in neuroeconomics (Glimcher & 
Sparks 1992, Platt & Glimcher 1999). Early work measured activity at specific locations in 
topographic maps of possible movements in advance of cued and rewarded saccades, 
finding that activity related meaningfully to expected subjective value from those 
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movements, and predicted saccade selection. 
 
Sherrington (1906) introduced the notion of a final common path, referring to the last 
neural stage at which competition between incompatible deployments of combinations of 
muscles can be resolved. He recognised that some different movements made conflicting 
demands on the same muscles. McFarland and Sibly (1975) in turn introduced the notion 
of a behavioural final common path to represent the control processes of a behaving 
organism, including both perceptual and motor competition. (The qualifier ‘behavioural’ 
distinguishes their proposal from Sherrington’s neural conception.) In highly compressed 
summary, McFarland and Sibly propose that the revealed preferences of an animal can be 
represented in a ‘candidate space’ where mutually exclusive actions and activities are 
ordered along dimensions according to relationships of ‘displacement’ over one another, 
determining a set of indifference curves. The determinants of the actions and activities of 
an animal can in turn be represented in a ‘causal factor space’ consisting of all variables 
causally relevant to the animal’s behaviour. This space is divided into a ‘cue space’ of 
external factors to which the animal is sensitive, and a ‘command space’ of internal factors. 
Considered abstractly, the task of behavioural ecology is to characterise the candidate 
space, and to determine the structure of the causal factor space, in principle being able to 
predict how changes in the causal factors will be expressed in behaviour. From this 
perspective neuroeconomics can be understood as applying tools of cognitive neuroscience 
to find the neural basis for value computations in the command space which explain the 
course of behaviour (Glimcher 2002). Much neuroeconomic research seeks to identify 
value representations and computations at or upstream of final common paths, something 
about which Glimcher (2011) is helpfully explicit. In the case of saccades from a stationary 
skull, for the reasons glossed above, this task is relatively tractable. Shadmehr and Ahmed’s 
treatment of vigor both articulates the relationships between speed of movement and 
returns from action, and confirms that neural processes of selection and control are 
sensitive to these relationships. 
 
Skeletal movements and their corresponding control systems, though, exhibit interacting 
complications absent in saccades. They are rarely ballistic, involve many more muscles, and 
often deploy linked series of joints. Most of the enormous variety of possible movements 
are sensitive to bodily orientation, gravitational loading, inertia, and the disposition and 
properties of nearby surfaces, which can all change independently of, and because of, the 
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movement itself. As a result, activity in somatotopic maps in the motor cortex doesn’t 
correspond nearly as neatly to bodily movement as it does with fixed-head saccades. The 
functional effects of different bodily movements can be substitutable to varying degrees, 
because different movements can achieve equivalent effects. Movements also stand in 
highly variable relations of mutual exclusivity, including cases where different goals can be 
pursued simultaneously. In consequence, the relationships between behavioural function 
and movement are neither simple nor direct, and opportunity costs harder to determine. 
Shadmehr and Ahmed are well aware of these considerations (see Shadmehr & 
Mussa-Ivaldi 2012), but it is worth focusing on their significance. 
 
There are indeed topographic maps of the body, but the complex mappings noted above 
mean that different parts of them are relevant to different combinations of functions, 
movements and conditions. There aren’t determinate final common paths corresponding 
only to those bodily resources relevant to an effect or function, since many can be achieved 
in multiple ways. (Some, but not all, ways of removing your spectacles involve your left 
elbow.) As Gallistel (1980) puts it, this implies that control of skeletal muscles must be 
expressed through a ‘lattice hierarchy’ in which the level at or before which competition 
over deployment of degrees of freedom must be resolved is highly variable. Any functional 
— as opposed to merely anatomical — topographic map or internal model for handling 
these relationships will have to be abstract and distributed. These considerations pose 
significant challenges to any attempt to study whole body vigor and its neural control with 
anything like the temporal specificity available in the saccade case. 
 
Shadmehr and Ahmed, like McFarland and Sibly (1975), hold that selection is made in 
terms of a ‘currency’ which ranks states, or actions conditional on states, in ways that have 
contributed to success under natural selection (Spurrett 2019). McFarland and Sibly 
explicitly specify a common currency, but Shadmehr and Ahmed share the presumption of 
commensurability. McFarland and Sibly note that the hypothesised ranking process, since it 
should take “all relevant motivational variables” into account, must be “located at a point 
of convergence in the motivational organization” (1975: 290). That is, the supposed 
optimising over all of the relevant factors — including bodily needs and their relative 
evolutionary urgency, the expected costs and returns of available actions, the physics and 
geometries of the actions themselves in context of the physics and geometry of the 




Dennett has argued that the notion of a determinate ‘finish line’ for the transition to 
consciousness is untenable over relatively short time-scales, in extended systems such as 
brains in their bodies which transmit information at finite speeds (Dennett 1991; Dennett 
& Kinsbourne 1992). In such cases the effective time-ordering of distal events about which 
information travels at finite speeds isn’t generally independent of where and how the 
determination is made. Dennett’s criticism of the pseudo-dualist view he calls ‘Cartesian 
materialism’, that is, is partly driven by reflection on the implications of the fact that “the 
‘point’ of view of the observer must be smeared over a rather large volume in the 
observer’s brain” (Dennett 1991: 107). This reasoning isn’t only relevant to consciousness, 
and applies to decisions, selection and control. The shared issue isn’t consciousness, but 
the suggested unproblematic determinacy of times ‘before’, ‘of’ and ‘after,’ becoming 
conscious or being decided. Recall that we’re supposing that estimates of all relevant costs 
— in time, calories, etc. — and rewards in their many modalities are to be integrated into 
the common currency, and applied to select deployments of the whole body. If we suppose 
that action selection is comprehensively informed by converging communication from 
across an extended sensorimotor system, and that there is a definite moment of decision, 
we need selection to happen at a point, or for there to be a determinate boundary across 
the lattice hierarchy demarcating events before and after selection. And we must not help 
ourselves to a supernatural external viewpoint here: relationships of before and after must 
be settled by processes operating at the speed of neural activity. 
 
Like Cartesian materialism, the view that selection takes place at a determinate moment, let 
alone at a point, is not openly defended. But other things people say and write suggest its 
influence. McFarland and Sibley’s passing reference to a ‘point of convergence’ may be one 
example. Shadmehr and Ahmed’s occasional remarks about the value estimating state of a 
whole agent at a ‘moment’, or to the rate of reward harvesting at an ‘instant’, and to a 
determinate ‘time of decision’ suggest it as well. These terms are, of course, meaningful in 
the mathematical models they are deploying. Those models can be expected to idealise and 
simplify neural reality, as Shadmehr and Ahmed are fully aware. 
 
Nonetheless, if there can’t be a central executive able to integrate everything quickly 
enough to make selection and control of all skeletal movement consistently sensitive to a 
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single value function responsive to all available information, something else must be going 
on. If there was a central executive that delayed until all the information was in, the 
resulting hesitations would be obvious. (Imagine waiting for a whole body ’collicular burst’ 
to determine whether to wave hello while walking.) A key feature of Dennett’s positive 
view of consciousness is the simultaneous construction, revision and propagation of 
incompletely specified interpretations (‘multiple drafts’) of the sensorimotor situation, 
where contingencies in the flow of interaction can contribute to which achieve the celebrity 
of consciousness, and where represented time can come apart from the temporal course of 
the vehicles of content. We can imagine an analogous process for selection and control 
where parallel sensorimotor processes corresponding to opportunities in the environment 
and occasioned by internal needs estimate the expected costs and returns of taking those 
opportunities, and compete for execution as long as there’s time. Cisek, independently of 
Dennett and focusing on action selection rather than consciousness, has imagined this, and 
called it the ‘affordance competition hypothesis’ (Cisek 2007). This does without the 
presumption of a determinate finish line by proposing that “the processes of action 
selection and specification occur simultaneously” (2007, p1586). On his view incoming 
sensory and bodily information selectively inform the generation of a number of 
incompletely specified candidate behaviours, which may be released into execution in 
advance of full specification. (The term ‘affordances’ is from Gibson’s (1979) ecological 
psychology.) Cisek’s affordance competition, that is, is a multiple drafts model of action 
selection and control, in which there’s no mandatory bottleneck for all deployments, and 
specification can sometimes lag behind selection. Shadmehr and Ahmed show that if such 
a theory is to be taken seriously, candidate actions must vary in vigor, and processes of 
competition and selection be sensitive to relationships between vigor and reward rate. 
 
It is a likely consequence of this type of view that value-sensitive computation — tracking 
needs, opportunities, expected costs and returns of candidate actions — is neurally 
widespread. Were it not so, the processes corresponding to different actions would be 
unsuited to flexible and swiftly expressed competition wherever needed in the lattice 
hierarchy. This picture, offered as a suggested way of talking and thinking that does 
without the implications of terms like ‘moment of decision’ including the implication of a 
determinate agent-wide time ‘before’ decision, is potentially consistent with what is 
revealed in many neuroeconomic experiments. When the expression of choice is severely 
constrained, when both the options themselves and the means of expressing them kept 
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strictly mutually exclusive, and when time itself is regimented with cues and delays, we 
might reasonably expect to find that both behaviour and neural processing fit our best 
theories most neatly. Our best theories should, for reasons Shadmehr and Ahmed 
convincingly articulate, be sensitive to the importance of vigor. That so many of our most 
compelling experiments don’t discourage interpretation in terms of determinate moments 
of, and before, choice for the whole agent, however, may tell us less about control on the 
hoof and in the wild than it does about what it takes to bring value tracking neural 
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